Endogenous Retirement and Monetary Cycles by d'Albis, Hippolyte & Augeraud-Véron, Emmanuelle
Endogenous Retirement and Monetary Cycles
Hippolyte D’Albis, Emmanuelle Augeraud-Ve´ron
To cite this version:
Hippolyte D’Albis, Emmanuelle Augeraud-Ve´ron. Endogenous Retirement and Monetary Cy-
cles. Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2008, 15 (4), pp.214-229.
<10.1080/08898480802440786>. <hal-00424801>
HAL Id: hal-00424801
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00424801
Submitted on 17 Oct 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Endogenous Retirement and Monetary Cycles1
Hippolyte d’ALBIS2
Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA)
Emmanuelle AUGERAUD-VE´RON3
LMA, Universite´ de La Rochelle
This version: October 9, 2007
First version: October 8, 2005
1We thank the guest editor Raouf Boucekkine and two anonymous referees for
their comments and criticism. We are also grateful to Eric Benoˆıt, Carmen Ca-
macho, Omar Licandro, Pierre Pestieau, Bertrand Wigniolle and the participants
of the Florence Vintage Workshop (EUI, 2005), the Toulouse Public Economics
Seminar and the OLG Workshop (University of Nantes, 2005) for their comments.
The usual disclaimer applies.
2Correspondence: LERNA, Universite´ de Toulouse I, 21 alle´e de Brienne, 31000
Toulouse, France. E-mail: hippolyte.d-albis@univ-tlse1.fr
3E-mail: eaugerau@univ-lr.fr
Abstract
In a model of overlapping generations with a continuum of finitely-lived indi-
viduals, the aggregate price dynamics is characterized by a functional differ-
ential equation of mixed type. Delays and advances are exogenous when age
at retirement is mandatory; they become state-dependent when individuals
are allowed to choose their age at retirement. Using the Hopf bifurcation the-
orem, periodic solutions in the neighborhood of the monetary steady state
appearing with a mandatory retirement age vanish with a chosen age.
JEL Classification: C62, D91, E3, J26.
1 Introduction
We study the relationship between retirement age and macroeconomic fluc-
tuations and show that allowing individuals to choose their retirement age
reduces the volatility of aggregate prices. The proof hinges on the assumption
that the economy produces a single non storable good, and on the assumption
that the demographic structure is in overlapping generations (OLG) with a
continuum of finitely-lived individuals.
The economy has no capital and produces a non storable good using
a linear technology with respect to aggregate labor. We also restrict our-
selves to monetary equilibria, for which the real value of the aggregate asset
holdings remains positive forever. Under mandatory age at retirement, the
framework amounts to an exchange economy. Price fluctuations have only
nominal and distributional effects. They modify the real consumption at the
individual level but not at the aggregate level. When individuals choose their
age at retirement, the economy is of the ‘yeoman farmer’ type. Price fluctu-
ations influence the real aggregate output, and consequently the aggregate
consumption.
The second assumption concerns age structure. The OLG model can
generate cycles, a feature appealing to economists having business cycles in
mind, and linked to sunspot equilibria (Cass and Shell, 1983). However, the
first proofs of the existence of such cycles (Gale, 1973; Benhabib and Day,
1982; Grandmont, 1985) relied on an OLG model composed of only two gen-
erations. Reichlin (1986), Jullien (1988) and Benhabib and Laroque (1988),
who extended the proofs to production economies, made the same assump-
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tion. This is worrying because the cycles these models can generate have
periods greater than or equal to the individuals’ life-span. Moreover, Sims
(1986) conjectured that increasing the frequency of trade among generations
would allow individuals to smooth the strong revenue effects necessary for
the existence of cycles. The first existence theorem was extended to OLG
models with either many generations (Aiyagari, 1989; Reichlin, 1992; Swan-
son, 1998; Simonovits, 1999; Bhattacharya and Russell, 2003; d’Albis and
Augeraud-Ve´ron, 2007) or, using the equivalence argument developed by
Balasko et al. (1980), with many commodities (Kehoe and Levine, 1984;
Kehoe et al. 1991; Ghiglino and Tvede, 1995). Ghiglino and Tvede (2004)
notably prove the existence in a model with many generations and many
commodities. However, none of these extensions includes labor supply deci-
sions as in Grandmont (1985). By introducing a choice of age at retirement,
we shall test the robustness of these results.
We use a continuous-time OLG model developed by Cass and Yaari
(1967), modified to allow for individual retirement decisions as in Boucekkine
et al. (2002, 2004). The inter-temporal equilibrium is the solution of a non-
linear functional differential equation of mixed type (MFDE). The dynamics
is indeed affected by discrete delays and advances. Delays are generated by
the vintage structure of the population; advances rely on individuals’ expec-
tations. Moreover, when retirement is endogenous, some delays and advances
are state-dependent. We characterize the monetary steady state and study
the existence of cycles in the neighborhood of the steady state. To prove
the existence, we follow Rustichini (1989) by looking for solutions of the lin-
earized MFDE which can have Hopf bifurcation values. We find that for
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certain sets of parameters, a cycle exists when retirement is exogenous; and
there is no cycle when retirement is endogenous. This means that the strong
revenue effects which still can yield cycles when the frequency of trade is
high, are less operative when individuals choose their age at retirement.
In section 2, we present an OLG model with continuous trading. In
section 3 we characterize the inter-temporal equilibrium. In section 4, we
study the linearized dynamics in the neighborhood of the monetary steady
state.
2 The Model
We describe the individual choices and the aggregation procedure. Time
t ≥ 0 is assumed to be continuous and to have a finite starting point.
2.1 Individual Behavior
Individuals live ω > 1 years. They derive utility from consumption and from
the duration of their retirement. Isoelastic preferences and no time discount
are assumed. The inter-temporal utility u (s) of an individual born at time
s ≥ 0 is given by:
u (s) =
∫ s+ω
s
c (s, t)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
dt+
(ω − (z (s))α)
1− 1
η
1− 1
η
, (1)
where c (s, t) ≥ 0 denotes the real consumption of an individual at time t born
at time s, and z (s) ∈ [0, ω] is age of retirement. σ > 0 stands for the elasticity
of inter-temporal substitution, η > 0 and α ∈ {0, 1}. α = 0 corresponds to
the exogenous retirement case, for which the age at retirement is mandatory
and normalized to 1. When α = 1, age at retirement is endogenous.
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The real wage e (s, t) is earned only by working individuals:
e (s, t) =
{
1 if t ∈ [s, s+ (z (s))α] ,
0 otherwise.
(2)
Individuals have access to a competitive asset market yielding the interest
rate r (t) which is also the deflation rate. a (s, t) is the real wealth of an
individual at time t born at time s. The instantaneous budget constraint is:
∂a (s, t)
∂t
= r (t) a (s, t) + e (s, t)− c (s, t) . (3)
Individuals were born with no financial asset and die with no debt. Initial
and terminal conditions are a (s, s) = 0 and a (s, s+ ω) ≥ 0. We assume
that a (s, t) and c (s, t) are piecewise C1
(
R
2
+
)
, that r (t) is continuous for
all t ∈ [s, s+ ω] and that e (s, t) is L2
(
R
2
+
)
. Finally, it will be convenient
to define the relative price between time t and time 0, such that: R (t) =
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r (u) du
)
.
The individual program is to maximize Eq. (1) subject to Eq. (3), under
the initial and terminal conditions. The separability of the objective allows us
to solve the program in two steps. First, a set of optimal consumption profiles
parameterized by (z (s))α is obtained; second, we compute the optimal age
at retirement.
Lemma 1 The optimal consumption profile satisfies:
c (s, t) =
∫ s+(z(s))α
s
R (v) dv∫ s+ω
s
(R (v))(1−σ) dv
(R (t))−σ . (4)
Proof: standard. 
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Lemma 2 There exists an optimal age of retirement belonging to (0, ω) and
satisfying:
αR (s+ (z (s))α)
( ∫ s+(z(s))α
s
R (v) dv∫ s+ω
s
(R (v))1−σ dv
)− 1
σ
− α (ω − (z (s))α)
−
1
η = 0. (5)
The optimal age at retirement is unique if:
− r (s+ (z (s))α)−
1
σ
R (s+ (z (s))α)∫ s+(z(s))α
s
R (v) dv
−
1
η
(ω − (z (s))α)
−1
< 0. (6)
Proof: Replacing Eq. (4) in Eq. (1) yields uˆ (z (s)). z (s) = 0 is not a so-
lution because limz(s)→0 uˆ (z (s)) = −∞ if σ ∈ (0, 1] and limz(s)→0 uˆ
′ (z (s)) =
+∞ if σ > 1. Moreover, z (s) = ω is not a solution because limz(s)→ω uˆ (z (s)) =
−∞ if η ∈ (0, 1] and limz(s)→ω uˆ
′ (z (s)) = −∞ if η > 1. Hence, there
exists z (s) ∈ (0, ω) which is a solution. This optimal solution satisfies
duˆ (z (s)) /dz (s) = 0 or equivalently Eq. (5). Then, a sufficient condition
for a global maximum is that d2uˆ (z (s)) /d (z (s))2 < 0 at the optimal point.
This condition is given by Eq. (6). 
The optimal age at retirement is given by a standard consumption-leisure
arbitrage. Eq. (4) shows that a longer retirement period implies a lower level
of consumption at each age and Eq. (5) shows that the optimum is obtained
when the marginal utility yielded by a supplementary unit of leisure equals
the marginal dis-utility yielded by the decrease in consumption. Optimal age
is necessarily an interior solution of the individual program but one should
not exclude multiple local maxima. If the condition given in Eq. (6) is not
satisfied, meaning that r (t) is negative, it may indeed exist multiple solutions
to Eq. (5). However, in section 4, we shall show that the optimal age of
retirement is unique in the neighborhood of the monetary steady state.
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2.2 Aggregation
The demographic structure is an OLG. Each cohort, whose size is normalized
to 1, is composed of identical individuals. There is no population growth and,
at each point of time, a new cohort enters the economy while the oldest one
leaves it. The population size is equal to ω.
There exists a single non storable good produced with a linear technology
with respect to aggregate labor. The total output P (t) equals the size of the
active population, which is solution of:
P (t) =
∫ t
t−ω
e (t− s) ds, (7)
where e (t− s) is defined in Eq. (2). The aggregate real consumption C (t)
is obtained by integrating over the individual consumptions from their birth
dates onward, c (s, t). Replacing Eq. (4) yields:
C (t) =
∫ t
t−ω
∫ s+(z(s))α
s
R (v) dv∫ s+ω
s
(R (v))(1−σ) dv
(R (t))−σ ds. (8)
Similarly, the aggregate real wealth is denoted A (t). Money is available;
it is a non perishable and non consumable bond which can constitute the
counterpart of individual assets. A given quantity of money was distributed
at time t = 0 and there was no other emission since then.
3 The Monetary Equilibrium
We prove the existence of the monetary steady state and provide comparative
statics. An inter-temporal equilibrium is defined as:
Definition 1 An inter-temporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is
a function F (t) = (C (t) , A (t) , R (t) , P (t) , z (t)), F : R+ → R
4
+ × [0, ω],
6
F (t) ∈ (C1 (R+))
3
× (L2 (R+))
2
such that (i) individuals maximize their
utility subject to budget constraints, (ii) the aggregate consumption equals
the output: C (t) = P (t), and (iii) the aggregate wealth is non negative:
A (t) ≥ 0.
The existence of money allows for a positive aggregate wealth at equilib-
rium. Consider the following particular equilibrium:
Definition 2 A monetary steady state is an inter-temporal equilibrium
with perfect foresight such that the aggregate wealth is a positive constant:
A > 0.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique monetary steady state characterized by the
quintuple (C,A, P,R, z) which satisfies: R = 1, A = (ω − zα) zα/2, P = C =
zα where zα is such that:
α
(
zα
ω
)
−
1
σ
= α (ω − zα)−
1
η . (9)
Proof: At equilibrium, the aggregate consumption equals the output, the
aggregate wealth is dA (t) /dt = r (t)A (t). This implies that r = 0, or
equivalently R = 1, is necessary to obtain a constant and positive aggregate
wealth. For r = 0, the condition in Eq. (6) is satisfied and there exists a
unique age of retirement which is constant. 
The interest rate equals the demographic growth rate at the monetary
steady state (Samuelson, 1958; Gale, 1973). By taking a stationary popula-
tion, we obtain constant steady state prices and constant individual consump-
tions over the life cycle. Lemma 3 states that money is always valuated. This
is a direct consequence of the introduction of retirement: in OLG economies,
money has indeed a value if and only if the average age of the consumer is
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strictly greater than the average age of the worker. Workers finance the pen-
sioners and the aggregate wealth is positive. Given our simple demographic
structure, these ages are easy to compute and worth ω/2 and zα/2 respec-
tively. With the statement of Lemma 2 such that zα ∈ (0, ω), we conclude
that the monetary steady state exists. In real terms, the value of money is
equal to the product of the output and the difference between the average
ages of consumption and production. At the limit zα → ω, money has no
value and the economy is autarkic.
The effect of age at retirement on aggregate wealth is ambiguous. Post-
poning retirement has a positive effect on wealth if and only if zα < ω/2.
Increasing z increases, on the one hand, the aggregate output and the indi-
vidual savings while, on the other hand, it increases the average age of the
worker which reduces the incentive to save. Another intuition is obtained
by computing the age at which each individual begins to dissave. Simple
algebra shows that this age is always equal to the age at retirement. Hence,
an increase of the age at retirement increases the aggregate wealth if the age
at which the dissaving begins belongs to the first half of life.
When age at retirement is exogenous, the monetary steady state is simply
characterized by the relative size of the active population. With Lemma 3,
aggregate wealth increases with life span ω: it increases the duration of
retirement and consequently creates an additional incentive for individual
saving. The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution has no influence on the
steady state because the population is stationary; this is no longer true when
the age at retirement is endogenous. The following proposition provides some
comparative statics for the yeoman farmer economy:
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Proposition 1 When the age at retirement is endogenous,
(i) an increase of longevity increases the age at retirement and aggregate
wealth. Moreover, there exists ω¯ > 1 such that z ≥ 1⇔ ω ≥ ω¯.
(ii) an increase of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution reduces the
age at retirement and has an ambiguous effect on the aggregate wealth. More-
over, if ω < 2, there exists σ¯ > 0 such that z ≥ 1⇔ σ ≤ σ¯; if ω ≥ 2, z > 1.
Proof: For α = 1, use Eq. (9) as an implicit equation. For part (i),
dz/dω ∈ (0, 1) and dA/dω > 0. Finally, ω¯ is computed explicitly by replacing
z = 1 in the implicit equation. For part (ii), because ω − z < 1 is always
true, one has dz/dσ < 0. Hence, the sign of dA/dσ is the opposite of the one
of dA/dz if and only if z > ω/2. Finally, with the implicit equation, z → ω
when σ → 0 and, replacing z = 1 compute σ¯ to conclude that σ¯ is positive
only if ω < 2. 
The intuition for Proposition 1 is that because of the consumption/leisure
arbitrage, an increase in longevity increases both the age and the duration
of retirement; hence, dz/dω ∈ (0, 1). The magnitude of the latter derivative
depends on the parameter η characterizing the curvature of the utility func-
tion with respect to leisure. A lower η means a utility more concave and a
higher dz/dω. At the limit η → 0, one obtains an age at retirement that
goes to its lower bound: ω − 1, and dz/dω → 1. The effect of longevity on
aggregate wealth is ambiguous because it increases both the average age of
the consumer and the average age of the worker. However, as dz/dω ∈ (0, 1),
the final effect is always positive. Chang (1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil
(2004) pointed out the importance of the assumption of certainty on indi-
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vidual life span. In case of uncertain life span, an increase in longevity can
reduce the age at retirement.
The effect of an increase of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
on retirement is negative. Indeed, at the monetary steady state where the
interest rate is zero, the elasticity does not influence the individual consump-
tion growth rate. It only modifies the arbitrage between consumption and
leisure in favor of the second one, which ultimately means less human wealth
and less consumption. The effect of the elasticity on aggregate wealth is the
opposite of the effect of the age at retirement on wealth.
4 Monetary Cycles
In the linearized dynamics in the neighborhood of the monetary steady state
given by Lemma 3, we analyze exogenous and endogenous retirement and
look for particular long-run fluctuations.
Definition 3 A monetary cycle is a periodic solution of the inter-
temporal equilibrium in the vicinity of the monetary steady state.
4.1 Exogenous Retirement
When the age at retirement is mandatory, replacing (2) in (7) yields the size
of the active population: P (t) = 1 for all t. The inter-temporal equilibrium
is characterized by the functional differential equation:
(R (t))σ =
∫ t
t−ω
∫ s+1
s
R (v) dv∫ s+ω
s
(R (v))(1−σ) dv
ds. (10)
The dynamics of R (t) depends on the entire set of observations of R in the
interval [t− ω, t+ ω]. Past observations, bringing delays in the dynamics,
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are generated by the vintage structure of human capital as in Boucekkine, de
la Croix and Licandro (2002), while future observations, yielding advances
in the dynamics, come from perfect foresight. Eq. (10) is non linear for any
σ 6= 1, meaning that revenue and substitution effects do not counterbalance
each other.
Following Rustichini (1989), the proof of the existence of periodic solu-
tions uses the Hopf bifurcation theorem. We consider the local dynamics
around R = 1: it is the one of x (t) defined such that R (t) = 1 + εx (t).
Property 1 The characteristic function H (λ) of x (t) satisfies:
H (λ) =
∫ 0
−ω
(∫ s+1
s
eλvdv
)
ds− ωσ −
(1− σ)
ω
∫ 0
−ω
(∫ s+ω
s
eλvdv
)
ds. (11)
Proof: Replace R (t) = 1 + εx (t) in Eq. (10) and Taylor expand in the
neighborhood of ε = 0. H (λ) is obtained by the change of variable x (t) = eλt
and some algebra. 
The characteristic function H (λ) has an infinity of complex roots with
negative real parts and an infinity of complex roots with positive real parts.
This implies that the linearized dynamics is initially characterized by os-
cillations that eventually disappear. These fluctuations are of few interest
because we study the dynamics in the neighborhood of the steady state.
The following lemma focuses on permanent fluctuations yielded by the pure
imaginary roots of H (λ).
Lemma 4 There exist (ω, σ) such that H (λ) has pure imaginary roots which
are Hopf bifurcation values.
Proof: 1) we assume λ = iq and prove that there exists a least one q > 0
such that H(iq) = 0. We define (ω0, σ0 (ω0)) the pair of parameters for which
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such a root exists. 2) We use σ as a bifurcation parameter and show that
there exists a neighborhood of σ0 such that dRe (H (λ)) /dσ is not equal to
zero while d Im (H (λ)) /dσ = 0.
1) Replace λ = iq in Eq. (11) to obtainH (iq) = Re (H (iq))+i Im (H (iq))
with:
Re (H (iq)) = −
(
cos (q)− 1− cos (q (ω − 1)) + cos (qω)
q2
)
−ωσ +
2 (1− σ)
ω
(
cos (qω)− 1
q2
)
, (12)
Im (H (iq)) = −
(
sin (q) + sin (q (ω − 1))− sin (qω)
q2
)
. (13)
(i) We show that there exist, for any σ, some (ω0, q (ω0)) such that Im (H (iq (ω0))) =
0. (ii) it shows that Re (H (iq (ω0))) = 0 is compatible with some σ > 0.
(i) Eq. (13) is also:
Im (H (iq)) = −
4 sin
(
q(ω−1)
2
)
sin
(
q
2
)
sin
(
qω
2
)
q2ω
. (14)
Roots of Im (H (iq)) are then q = 2kpi, q = 2kpi/ω and q = 2kpi/ (ω − 1) for
k ∈ Z. Eq. Re (H (iq)) = 0 is rewritten as:
σ =
−4 sin2
(
qω
2
)
+ 2ω
[
sin2
(
qω
2
)
+ sin2
(
q
2
)]
− ω + ω cos (q (ω − 1))
−4 sin2
(
qω
2
)
+ (ωq)2
. (15)
Consider the roots q = 2kpi/ (ω − 1) for k ∈ Z, replace them in Eq. (15) and
rearrange to obtain:
σ =
(ω − 1)
(qω)2
4 sin2( q
2
)
− 1
. (16)
With ω > 1, conclude that the RHS of Eq. (16) is positive. For any
(ω, 2kpi/ (ω − 1)) , k ∈ Z, Im (H (iq)) = 0 is satisfied and there exists a
σ > 0 such that Re (H (iq)) = 0. Notice that Re (H (iq)) 6= 0 for q = 2kpi.
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2) Let λ = p+ iq. Using Eq. (11), one has:
dRe (H (λ))
dσ
= −ω +
cos (qω)
ω
∫ 0
−ω
(∫ s+ω
s
epvdv
)
ds. (17)
Compute Eq. (17) for p = 0, it is not zero because q 6= 2kpi/ω. 
The following lemma indicates the space of parameters giving rise to a
cycle.
Lemma 5 There exists a monetary cycle of period q only if σ < q/ω.
Proof: We prove the lemma for ω < 2, which is the realistic case for a age
at retirement equal to 1. The proof for ω ≥ 2 is similar and available upon
request. We shall show that σ − q/ω < 0 when σ is defined by Eq. (16) and
q = 2kpi/ (ω − 1). First, σ − q/ω < φ (k, ω) with
φ (k, ω) =
(ω − 1)(
ωkpi
(ω−1)
)2
− 1
−
2kpi
ω (ω − 1)
. (18)
It is sufficient to show that φ (k, ω) < 0. Because ∂φ (k, ω) /∂k < 0, we have
to prove that φ (1, ω) < 0. Then, ∂φ (1, ω) /∂ω > 0 for ω > 1 and that
φ (1, 2) ≃ −3. 
Sufficiently strong revenue effects are necessary to obtain monetary cycles.
The magnitude of these effects depends on the periodicity of the price cycle
or, equivalently, of the inflation rate cycle, with respect to the individual life-
span: to obtain a cycle with a lower periodicity, a stronger revenue effect is
necessary. We obtain this result with a discount rate equal to zero although
cycles are more likely to occur when individuals discount the future.
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4.2 Endogenous Retirement
To identify the inter-temporal equilibrium, we characterize the active popu-
lation size and how cohorts leave the labor market, and we define the “last
in, last out” property.
Definition 4 For all t ≥ 0, let s0 be the greatest s ∈ [t− ω, t] such that
s0 + z (s0) = t. Cohorts satisfy the “last in, last out” property if and only if
for all s < s0, s+ z (s) ≥ t.
According to definition 4, when there is “last in, last out”, cohorts leave
the labor market in the same order they have entered it; hence P (t) =
z (t− P (t)). Otherwise, it can exist a date t0 such that there is no cohort
leaving the labor market and a date t1 such that different cohorts leave it
simultaneously. In such situations, the analytical characterization of the
inter-temporal equilibrium would be complicate. However, the next lemma
excludes such situations in the neighborhood of the steady state.
Lemma 6 In the neighborhood of the monetary steady state, the “last in,
last out” property holds.
Proof: The optimal age at retirement, defined as the z (.) solution of
Eq. (5), is continuously differentiable with respect to s. Indeed, as R (.) ∈
C1 (R+), then z (s) is C
1 (R+). Consequently, there is “last in, last out” if
and only if 1 + dz (s) /ds > 0. In the neighborhood of the monetary steady
state this condition is satisfied because dz (s) /ds = 0. 
It is now possible to characterize the inter-temporal equilibrium in the
neighborhood of the monetary steady state. It is the solution of the following
system of non linear functional differential equations with state-dependent
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delays and advances:

P (t) (R (t))σ =
∫ t
t−ω
(R (s+ z (s)))σ (ω − z (s))
σ
η ds,∫ t+z(t)
t
R (v) dv = (R (t+ z (t)))σ (ω − z (t))
σ
η
∫ t+ω
t
(R (v))1−σ dv,
P (t) = z (t− P (t)) .
(19)
The first equation of System (19) is the equilibrium condition in the good
market which was modified by replacing the optimal condition on individual
retirement (the second equation). The dynamics of R is governed by dis-
tributed delays and advances while the dynamics of z depends on the future
observations of R only. The third equation characterizes the population size
when there is “last in, last out”. The main difference between system (19)
and Eq. (10) consists of the presence of state-dependent delays and advances.
Consider the local dynamics around the steady state defined by Eq. (9).
After Cooke and Huang (1996), it is the one of (x (t) , y (t) , h (t)) defined
such that: 

R (t) = 1 + εx (t) ,
z (t) = z + εy (t) ,
P (t) = z + εh (t) ,
(20)
where z satisfies
(
z
ω
)
−
1
σ − (ω − z)−
1
η = 0. State-dependent delays and ad-
vances vanish in the linearized system and it is possible to apply Rusti-
chini (1989).
Property 2 The characteristic function of the linearized system is de-
noted Q (λ) and satisfies:
Q (λ) = 2ω +
σzω
η (ω − z)
+
(ω − z) ηω
σz
−
(
1 +
σz
(ω − z) ηω
∫ 0
−ω
eλ(s+z)ds
)
∗
(
(ω − z) ηω
σz
+
ω
zσ
∫ z
0
eλ(v−z)dv −
(1− σ)
σ
∫ ω
0
eλ(v−z)dv
)
. (21)
Proof: Replace system (20) in system (19) and Taylor expand in the
neighborhood of ε = 0. This yields h (t) = y (t− z) and a system of two
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equations. Write the Jacobian matrix J and then Q (λ) = detJ. Some
algebra yields Eq. (21). 
As in the previous case, only pure imaginary roots are considered.
Lemma 7 Q (λ) has no pure imaginary roots.
Proof: The proof shows that |Q (iq)| > 0. Using Eq. (21), one has:
|Q (iq)| =
∣∣∣∣2ω + σzωη (ω − z) + (ω − z) ηωσz −
∣∣∣∣
(
1 +
σz
(ω − z) ηω
∫ 0
−ω
eiq(s+z)ds
)
∗
(
(ω − z) ηω
σz
+
ω
zσ
∫ z
0
eiq(v−z)dv −
(1− σ)
σ
∫ ω
0
eiq(v−z)dv
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ .(22)
Consequently, |Q (iq)| ≥ |φ (σ)| where:
φ (σ) = 2ω +
σzω
η (ω − z)
+
(ω − z) ηω
σz
−
ω
σ
(
1 +
σz
(ω − z) η
)(
(ω − z) η
z
+ (1 + ε) + |1− σ|
)
. (23)
with ε > 0. Showing that φ (σ) < 0 for all σ > 0 is then sufficient to conclude.
One indeed has: φ′ (σ) > 0 while φ (1) < 0 and limσ→+∞ φ (σ) < 0. 
The main result of this section is presented in:
Proposition 2 When the age at retirement is optimally chosen by individ-
uals, the occurrence of monetary cycles is ruled out.
Proof: Given lemmas 4 and 7, the proof is immediate. 
We now turn to the general comment of this section. In the exogenous
retirement case, we have shown that increasing the frequency of trade in gen-
erations is not sufficient to smooth the strong revenue effects which can yield
cycles in OLG models. Conversely, introducing a simple leisure choice mod-
elled as a retirement decision was proved to be necessary for the occurrence
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of monetary cycles. The intuition is that for mandatory age at retirement,
an anticipation of high prices, corresponding to a low interest rate, increases
the individual savings when the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is
small. This increases the aggregate wealth and increases the prices. But
if individuals are allowed to choose their age at retirement, an anticipation
of high prices is an incitation to retire later because high prices imply high
nominal wages. This lowers the incitation to save and the final effect on
aggregate wealth is lower than in the mandatory retirement case.
Proposition 2 should extend to more general economies. First, allowing
for endogenous entrance into the labor market, with a schooling decision as
in de la Croix and Licandro (1999), would produce the same result: cycles
would be more likely with a mandatory age for the end of education than
with an optimally chosen one. In production economies, some non linearities
are added, and then endogenous cycles are possible even with endogenous
labor supply. This was notably shown by Whitesell (1986) and Matsuyama
(2005). However, in a two-period framework, Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004)
and Nourry and Venditti (2006) proved that cycles occur less frequently when
individuals consume during their youth.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed the existence of long-run fluctuations in OLG economies. We
showed that when individuals choose their age at retirement, certain periodic
solutions of the inter-temporal equilibrium dynamics vanish. The study of
the existence and uniqueness of the inter-temporal equilibrium remains to
be done. For linear MFDE, the existence problem was studied by d’Albis
17
and Augeraud-Ve´ron (2004) while the indeterminacy issue was analyzed by
Demichelis and Polemarchakis (2007). However, the problem is heightened
with state-dependent delays because of the characterization of the initial
conditions.
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